



Minimalism and Deliberative Democracy: A Closer Look 
at the Virtues of “Shallowness” 
Matthew Steilen† 
In hard cases, people can often agree that a certain practice is or is 
not constitutional, even when the theories that underlie their judg-
ments sharply diverge. . . .  In ordinary life, we might attempt to 
bracket the fundamental issues and decide that however they are 
best resolved, a particular approach makes sense for the next month 
or year.  So too in law, politics, and morality. . . .  This phenomenon 
has an especially notable feature: It enlists silence, on certain basic 
questions, as a device for producing convergence despite disagree-
ment, uncertainty, limits of time and capacity, and heterogeneity.  In 
short, silence can be a constructive force.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judicial minimalism is an account of how judges should, and some-
times do, decide the cases before them.2  Generally speaking, minimalist 
judges prefer to resolve difficult cases in a modest way.3  They favor nar-
row decisions, confined to the facts of the case; and they favor shallow 
decisions, avoiding any large account of the problem at hand and how it 
should be resolved.4  “Instead of adopting theories,” Cass Sunstein says, 
minimalist judges “decide cases.”5 
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 1. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 828–29 (2008). 
 2. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995); see also Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would be Out-
raged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
 3. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1, at 825. 
 4. Id. at 825–26. 
 5. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9. 
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Although minimalism has proven a popular target, it has also had a 
tremendous influence, and there is much to like about the theory.6  For 
one, minimalism reflects the common sense we use when making deci-
sions in our own lives.7  When faced with a complex problem, such as 
whether to choose a certain career or how to invest our savings, we may 
be inclined, out of caution, to take small steps, just as minimalism advo-
cates.  When a dispute arises with a loved one, we may be wise to brack-
et “foundational issues” and simply seek an agreement about how to re-
solve the problem at hand.  Minimalism is also attractive because it co-
heres with strongly held intuitions about how courts in a democracy 
ought to operate.8  In a democracy, the idea goes, foundational issues are 
supposed to be resolved by the people or their elected representatives.  
The minimalist judge respects this intuition by leaving foundational is-
sues unresolved.9  Her opinions rely only on rationales that “diverse 
people can agree [on], notwithstanding their disagreement on or uncer-
tainty about the most fundamental issues.”10 
This article is about a second connection between judicial minimal-
ism and democracy.  The central claim of the article is that minimalism 
does not “spur” or “promote” democracy, as Sunstein has long argued it 
does.11  Sunstein’s basic idea is that a court can promote democratic ac-
tivity by using certain procedures or doctrines to issue minimalist deci-
sions.12  For example, a court could use the non-delegation doctrine to 
require that a matter be addressed by legislation rather than simply by 
executive discretion.13  Requiring the legislature to address the matter 
promotes democratic activity.  My argument is that minimalism does not 
                                                            
 6. For a sampling of recent criticisms of minimalism, see Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643 (2008); Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They?  A Response to If 
People Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2007); 
Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court 
Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005); Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the 
Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753 (2004).  Nota-
bly, Sunstein himself has offered some criticism of minimalism.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Prob-
lems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2006). 
 7. See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1, at 826, 828. 
 8. Here and throughout, by “courts,” I mean courts whose judges are unelected—principally 
the federal courts in our system.  Elected judges, in contrast, are in some respects the elected repre-
sentatives of the people and arguably do not face the same questions of legitimacy faced by un-
elected judges. 
 9. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1, at 827. 
 10. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 2, at 364. 
 11. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 24–28.  The thesis is distinct from the one already men-
tioned, supra.  It is one thing to argue that a minimalist decision makes room for democracy by 
leaving a foundational issue unresolved; it is another thing to say that doing so will somehow spur its 
democratic resolution.  Sunstein himself makes this distinction.  Id. at 26. 
 12. Id. at 5, 27. 
 13. Id. at 27. 
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promote democracy because minimalist decisions lack the depth neces-
sary to promote democratic activity.  Like Sunstein, I endorse a view of 
democracy that is based on deliberation.14  Democracy is, at its heart, a 
procedure for exercising state power based on reasoning between free 
and equal citizens.15  Minimalist decisions do not promote democratic 
deliberation because they fail to give those of a different viewpoint a rea-
son to change their minds.  Whereas minimalism advocates “shallow” 
decisions, changing minds often requires “deep” arguments. 
Let me illustrate the problem using a simple, non-legal example.  
Suppose you are of the view that the government should not permit the 
media to photograph returning coffins of soldiers who have died in war.16  
You think such photographs would undermine morale.  I favor allowing 
them, on the grounds that they would help the public understand the true 
cost of war.  A minimalist resolution of this dispute might let the families 
of the fallen soldiers decide on a case-by-case basis, out of respect for 
their wishes—a principle that you and I can agree is important.  But does 
the decision “spur” us to resolve our differences by reasoning through 
them together?  I do not see how it would. 
Consider another example, based on one of Sunstein’s own.17  You 
are of the view that endangered animal species should be protected be-
cause we have an obligation not to destroy animals, at least if we can 
prevent it.  I agree with you that protecting endangered species is impor-
tant, but my view is based on utilitarian considerations: a species may 
prove vitally important to us—for example, as the source of a medi-
cine—and we should preserve these resources.18  The minimalist sees no 
need for us to resolve our differences, as long as we can agree on a 
course of action.19  That may be a wise approach, but I do not see how it 
promotes deliberation between us.  It would seem to do just the opposite. 
                                                            
 14. Id. at 24–25. 
 15. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY & 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 99 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) 
(1989) (“The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an ideal of political justifi-
cation.  According to this ideal, to justify the exercise of collective political power is to proceed on 
the basis of a free public reasoning among equals.”). 
 16. See Ann Scott Tyson, Media Ban Lifted for Bodies’ Return, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, at 
A2. 
 17. See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, at 1736. 
 18. See MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 29–55 (2004) (distinguish-
ing similar approaches to resource conservation and managing pollution). 
 19. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, at 1736. 
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The thesis that judicial minimalism promotes democracy is an im-
portant part of the broader theory of minimalism.20  It constitutes in large 
part minimalism’s response to the familiar concerns of countermajorita-
rianism; a court that promotes the democratic resolution of the most fun-
damental issues before it cannot fairly be charged with “judicial lawmak-
ing” on those issues.21  More generally, the thesis shows, in an intuitive 
way, how the court as an institution fits within our scheme of democratic 
government.  Minimalist decisions reflect the special institutional com-
petence of the court: resolving disputes.22  When a court attempts to do 
more—for example, propound deep theories about the law or human 
conduct—it risks erring in ways that have significant effects and are not 
easily correctable.23  Minimalism thus reduces the probability of judicial 
error and promotes the democratic resolution of fundamental social is-
sues, which the political branches of government have the competence to 
properly resolve.24  By acknowledging its own limitations in these mat-
ters, the court also shows respect for those who do not share its views.25 
The aim of this article is to show why these important claims do not 
succeed, by developing, at greater length, the argument outlined above.  
The article proceeds in three parts.  Part II begins with an analysis of the 
structure of minimalism.  It examines the ideas of narrowness and shal-
lowness in depth, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decisions in United 
States v. Virginia and Brandenburg v. Ohio.  With this groundwork laid, 
Part III reconstructs Sunstein’s thesis that minimalism promotes democ-
                                                            
 20. Neil Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1974–78 
(1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 2) (describing Sunstein’s concern with showing the connec-
tion between minimalism and democracy). 
 21. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5 (“The first suggestion is that certain forms of minimalism 
can be democracy-promoting, not only in the sense that they leave issues open for democratic delibe-
ration, but also and more fundamentally in the sense that they promote reason-giving and ensure that 
certain important decisions are made by democratically accountable actors.” (emphasis added)). 
 22. See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, at 1738 (noting that shal-
low decisions are “well suited to the institutional limits of the judiciary.”). 
 23. Josh Benson, The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, but It Rhymes: The Second Coming of the 
Liberal Anti-Court Movement, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1071, 1081 (2008) (“The second main ad-
vantage of minimalism is that it comports with the Court’s narrow institutional competence.  Unlike 
a legislature, which can correct mistakes and draw on expert information, the Court lacks serious 
policy expertise.  This means not only that sweeping rulings are likely to be wrong, but they acquire 
precedential value that makes them difficult to correct.”). 
 24. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39–41; Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the 
Minimalist, 89 Geo. L.J. 2297, 2307 (2001) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 2) (“[Minimalism] 
turns a failure to resolve constitutional issues . . . into a positive political good, and not merely the 
means by which the Court protects its institutional position.  When the Court leaves a constitutional 
issue open, the nation continues to deliberate about it.  This process allows a democratic solution in 
Sunstein’s special sense of democracy-to-emerge.  Completing the circle, the Court eventually em-
braces the democratic solution.  Doing so, it simultaneously remains in tune with the nation, safe-
guards its position, and advances democracy.”). 
 25. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 40–41, 259. 
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racy.  It begins by examining the deliberative account of democracy and 
uses the case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville to show how mini-
malism could be thought to promote deliberative democracy.26  Part IV 
then criticizes the democracy-promotion thesis along the lines of the ar-
gument sketched above and anticipates several objections to the argu-
ment.  Finally, the article concludes by drawing on the theory of popular 
constitutionalism to show why deep decisions need not transgress the 
proper role of courts within democratic society. 
II.  ANALYZING MINIMALISM 
A.  The Components of Minimalism 
In the opening pages of One Case at a Time, Sunstein lays out the 
procedural characteristics of the minimalist court.27  The description in 
these pages, although compressed, introduces many of the ideas that 
form the core of minimalism.  Several things are notable about the court 
Sunstein envisions.  First, it exhibits a remarkable sense of self-
awareness, or self-consciousness, for an institution of government.28  
Second, the characteristics of the court on which Sunstein is focused 
seem to fall into several rough categories.  This becomes apparent if we 
rearrange the characteristics and put them into a list.29  The minimalist 
court: 
(1) is “alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a hetero-
geneous society”;30 
(2) “knows there is much it does not know”; is “intensely aware of 
its own limitations”;31 
(3) is “[a]lert to the problem of unanticipated consequences”;32 
(4) “wants to accommodate new judgments about facts and val-
ues”;33 
                                                            
 26. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
 27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at ix–xiv, 8–14. 
 28. Sunstein’s court is deeply concerned about its own limits and its role in society.  Why a 
court should be so self-aware is an interesting question.  Minimalism seems uniquely appropriate in 
contexts where the legitimacy or role of the court in the broader system of government has been 
challenged. 
 29. Notably, with the exception of characteristics ten and eleven, the quotations listed below 
come from the Preface to One Case at a Time.  For some reason, Sunstein says rather little about 
shallowness in the Preface, and so I have helped myself to descriptions of shallowness occurring in 
the first chapter. 
 30. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at ix. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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(5) “settles the case before it, but . . . leaves many things unde-
cided”;34 
(6) “seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds”;35 
(7) “avoids clear rules”;36 
(8) “[avoids] final resolutions”;37 
(9) “seeks to provide rulings that can attract support from people 
with diverse [moral, religious and philosophical] commitments”;38 
(10) seeks “[a]greements on particulars”;39 
(11) justifies its opinions “not by abstract theories but by unambi-
tious reasoning”;40 
(12) “sees itself as part of a system of democratic deliberation”;41 
(13) “attempts to promote . . . participation, deliberation, and res-
ponsiveness”;42 
(14) “allows continued space for democratic reflection from Con-
gress and the states.”43 
I count three categories of characteristics in this list.  The first four 
characteristics describe the minimalist court’s understanding of its own 
epistemic position, that is, of what the court can know, particularly in 
light of the legal issues it faces and the diversity of beliefs about those 
issues.  These “epistemic characteristics” describe a court that acknowl-
edges its understanding to be limited in a non-trivial way.  Of course, 
everyone’s understanding is limited in a broad sense; the idea here is that 
the limits are substantial and may cause the court to overreach. 
Characteristics five through eleven describe norms that govern de-
cision-making itself.  We have already discussed several of these “deci-
sional characteristics” and will explore them at length below; roughly 
speaking, they describe decisions closely tied to the facts of the case and 
justified by run-of-the-mill judicial reasoning (for example, the use of the 
canons of statutory interpretation or citation to binding authority).  An 
                                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at x. 
 34. Id. at ix. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at x. 
 39. Id. at 13. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at ix–x. 
 42. Id. at x. 
 43. Id. 
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important feature of the decisional characteristics is their relationship to 
the epistemic characteristics identified above.  According to the minimal-
ist, narrow and shallow decisions are appropriate in light of the epistemic 
limitations faced by the court.  For example, because the court is “alert to 
the existence of reasonable disagreement in a heterogeneous society,” it 
should seek to issue decisions that can attract support from the members 
of this heterogeneous group. 
The final characteristics, twelve through fourteen, capture the mi-
nimalist court’s role within broader political society.  These are the “po-
litical characteristics” of the minimalist court.  The political characteris-
tics of greatest importance to the minimalist are leaving room for and 
promoting democratic deliberation on matters of fundamental importance 
to society. 
To summarize, then, the view is this: the procedural characteristics 
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The characteristics in each group are related to those in the other 
two groups in important ways for the theory.  For example, as discussed 
above, minimalist courts issue decisions described in {D} because they 
acknowledge the epistemic limits described in {E}.44  We might say that 
the minimalist court is a {D} court because it is an {E} court.  In a simi-
lar sense, the limits acknowledged in {E} support the role for courts de-
scribed in {P}.45  And courts that issue decisions described in {D} relate 
to political society as described in {P}.46 
None of this, of course, is meant to represent a deep insight into 
Sunstein’s minimalism.  What it does do is help to organize the compo-
nents of the theory.  On the organization above, minimalism is funda-
mentally an account of the relationship between the epistemic and politi-
cal characteristics of the federal courts.  The decisional characteristics 
most commonly identified with minimalism—narrowness and shallow-
ness—provide a kind of bridge between the epistemic and the political.  
They show how an institution such as the court, which faces significant 
epistemic limits, can situate itself comfortably within our democratic 
constitutional system.  It can do so, says the minimalist, by issuing nar-
row and shallow decisions, which is consistent with both the court’s epis-
temic limitations and its role in a democracy. 
This makes it crucially important, for purposes of deciding whether 
courts should issue narrow and shallow decisions, to determine whether 
or not such opinions do promote democracy.  Before answering that 
question, however, it is necessary to say more about narrowness and 
shallowness. 
B.  Narrowness 
When a court makes a narrow decision, it resolves the particular 
case before it instead of issuing a broad rule.47  A narrow decision “at-
tempt[s] to focus on the particulars of the dispute,” which allows the 
court to “leav[e] a great deal undecided.”48 
1.  United States v. Virginia and Narrowness as “Prophylaxis” 
To better understand what narrowness means, consider the case of 
United States v. Virginia, where the Court determined whether the refus-
al of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to admit women violated the 
                                                            
 44. See id. at 40–41. 
 45. See id. at 259. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10; Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 
1, at 826; Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 2, at 363. 
 48. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 2, at 362. 
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Equal Protection Clause.49  The state of Virginia advanced several argu-
ments in support of VMI’s exclusionary policy.  First, it argued that the 
existence of an all-male VMI was justified because it diversified the edu-
cational opportunities available to male Virginians.50  Second, it argued 
that to admit women into VMI would fundamentally change the kind of 
education the institution could offer, since by nature women were not 
suited to the school’s “adversative” pedagogical method.51  Third, it ar-
gued that even if VMI’s refusal to admit women violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the appropriate remedy was the establishment of the Vir-
ginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), a liberal arts college 
solely for women.52 
The Court rejected all three of Virginia’s claims, but it did so in a 
way that left central questions unanswered.  The first argument was re-
jected after an examination of the history of education in Virginia and the 
establishment of VMI.53  This examination evidenced that, at the time of 
VMI’s founding, there were few educational opportunities for women.  
That being the case, VMI could not have been introduced in order to 
broaden the educational opportunities for men, who would have had 
access to single-sex education as it was.54  Thus, history being what it 
was, Virginia’s justification failed to meet the applicable constitutional 
standard, which required an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for 
the discrimination.55  The Court’s argument implies that had Virginia 
founded VMI to diversify the educational opportunities for Virginia men, 
the Court might have upheld its exclusionary policy.  In fact, the Court 
noted that an express effort to promote educational diversity by offering 
single-sex education, committed to equality of opportunity, might be 
constitutional.56  In this way, the Court’s decision left open the issue of 
whether in another case the diversification-through-exclusion argument 
might meet the “exceedingly persuasive” standard.57  The second pro-
posed justification was rejected in a similarly narrow fashion. 
                                                            
 49. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  Although the following analysis is consis-
tent with Sunstein’s, it is developed differently in some respects.  Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 
165–67. 
 50. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535–38. 
 51. Id. at 540. 
 52. Id. at 547. 
 53. Id. at 535–38. 
 54. See id. at 539–40. 
 55. See id. at 539 (“In sum, we find no persuasive evidence in this record that VMI’s male-only 
admission policy is in furtherance of a state policy of ‘diversity.’” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
 56. Id. at 534–35; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 164. 
 57. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
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The remedy suggested by Virginia was rejected on comparatively 
narrow grounds as well.  Virginia proposed the admission of women into 
what was, in effect, a “separate but equal” institution to VMI, VWIL.58  
The Court rejected this remedy, but not because it held anything as broad 
as the Brown-v.-Board proposition that separate facilities were inherently 
unequal.  Rather, it again looked to the particular facts of the case.  As it 
happened, VWIL did not offer its female students the same “adversative” 
military-style education that VMI offered its male students.59  For exam-
ple, VWIL students did not live in a military-style residence and were 
not required to wear uniforms or eat their meals together—features re-
garded at VMI as essential to the adversative method.60  Nor did a VWIL 
education include many of the benefits that accompanied a VMI educa-
tion, principally the financial resources available to the school and the 
alumni network available to its graduates.61  Again, a focus on the partic-
ular facts of the case left Virginia’s general argument open.  A state cer-
tainly could offer a fully adversative education for women.  Nowhere did 
the Court hold that a women’s institution that did so would nevertheless 
provide an insufficient remedy for women excluded from a fully parallel, 
military-style “brother” institution. 
Thus, it was the Supreme Court’s use of the facts in Virginia that 
made the decision “narrow.”  The Court’s use of the facts differed from 
two more familiar senses in which courts use the facts to dispose of a 
case.  First, whether a particular statute or common-law principle applies 
in a case will depend on the case’s facts.  That is just to say that the ap-
plicability of legal principles turns on facts.  Second, the facts of a case 
define, in part, both the structure and the limits of any legal rule estab-
lished by the court in that case.  In other words, the scope of the 
precedent established in a case depends on the facts.  Loosely speaking, 
we might refer to these uses of the facts as, respectively, “deductive” and 
“inductive.”  The first use is “deductive” because, in a very rough sense, 
the facts permit the court to deduce the outcome of the case from the 
rule.  The second use is “inductive” because the facts constitute the basis 
from which a general legal rule might be induced.62  Facility with the 
facts in both senses is the bread and butter of litigation. 
The Court made a different use of the facts in Virginia.  In the ar-
guments discussed above, the Court used the facts to prevent it from hav-
                                                            
 58. Id. at 546. 
 59. Id. at 548–49. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 551–54. 
 62. These expressions are not meant in any kind of a technical sense, despite the fact that they 
have a technical sound to them.  To change the comparison slightly, the facts act as a kind of “minor 
premise” in a syllogism. 
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ing to “deductively” apply a broad legal principle or to “inductively” 
generate one.  Of course, elsewhere the Court did set out a broad legal 
principle.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion requires sex-based discrimination 
to have an “exceedingly persuasive” justification.63  But the arguments 
discussed do not set out broad principles.  For example, the Court never 
arrived at the question of whether diversification amounted to an excee-
dingly persuasive justification for discrimination, since it was cut short 
by the fact that this case did not present an instance of diversification 
through exclusion.  In a similar fashion, the Court did not fully resolve 
the question of whether sexually segregated educational institutions that 
offered truly equal opportunities would be constitutional.  It did not need 
to, since VWIL was clearly unequal to VMI in the relevant respects.  By 
avoiding the consideration of propositions that would have applicability 
outside a very narrow range of cases factually similar to Virginia, the 
Court effectively confined the precedential scope of its holding.  In a 
sense, it employed the facts as a kind of prophylactic: the facts prevented 
the Court from reaching questions that would have had wide effect had 
they been decided. 64  Instead, the Court resolved only the case before it. 
2.  Other Senses of Narrowness 
“Prophylaxis” is neither the only way, nor the most obvious way, 
that a decision can be narrow.  A decision may also be narrow if it is 
handed down in a case involving unique parties or unusual facts.  Un-
usual facts will work to confine a holding even if that holding is ex-
pressed in general terms.65  Decisions may also be narrow by stipulation, 
when a court expressly states that its reasoning in the case at hand will 
not have precedential value outside of those confines.  The Court’s opi-
nion in Bush v. Gore famously contained such a stipulation.66  Indeed, 
Sunstein sometimes speaks of narrowness in these ways.67 
                                                            
 63. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33. 
 64. In this context, “prophylactic” and “prophylaxis” are meant in a figurative sense, as sug-
gesting a preventative mechanism of some kind.  Here, the Court is using the facts to prevent it from 
reaching a broad question. 
 65. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2009) (“The Court’s decision is grounded in 
unusual facts that necessarily limit its reach.”) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 66. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present cir-
cumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many com-
plexities.”). 
 67. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 18–19.  Sunstein in effect combines the two alternative 
senses of narrowness when he writes, “In United States v. Virginia, the Court was careful to limit its 
decision to VMI, a ‘unique’ institution.”  Id.  In my judgment, this suggestion—which is not elabo-
rated anywhere else—presents a less plausible view of what makes Virginia a narrow decision than 
the account above. 
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However, Virginia is not the only leading case where the Court has 
employed the facts as a prophylactic to issue a narrow decision.  The 
Court used a similar strategy in Romer v. Evans,68 Rasul v. Bush,69 and 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld70—all decisions that Sunstein has described as nar-
row.71  In Romer, the Court avoided the question of whether the Consti-
tution protected specific gay rights, such as a right to marry.72  Instead, 
the Court examined the provision and concluded that it was “inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class that it affects” and therefore 
lacked a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.73  By using 
rational basis review as it did, the Court avoided contentious questions 
about constitutional protections for gay rights.  Similarly, in Rasul, the 
Court expressly declined to reach the question of whether Guantanamo 
detainees had a constitutional right to petition for the writ of habeas cor-
pus and fastened onto the statutory basis on which federal court jurisdic-
tion over such petitions rested.74  Finally, in Hamdi, the Court held only 
that the petitioner, a United States citizen detained as an enemy comba-
tant, was entitled to a more elaborate set of procedures for challenging 
his detention than he had in fact been granted—not that the power of the 
executive to indefinitely detain enemy combatants was subject to any 
substantive limitation under constitutional guarantees of liberty.75 
Moreover, there is an important reason to doubt that other interpre-
tations of narrowness (unique facts and stipulation by the court) capture 
the important idea.  Prophylaxis is the only account of narrowness that 
explains how deep decisions can also be narrow.76 
According to Sunstein, narrowness and shallowness are conceptual-
ly independent features.77  Thus, he argues that a decision can be wide 
                                                            
 68. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 69. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 70. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 71. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17 (table); Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 2, at 
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basis review). 
 73. Id. at 632. 
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confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in a territory over 
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 75. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
 76. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 16–19; Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra 
note 1, at 827; Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 2, at 365 (identifying United States v. 
Virginia as being deep and narrow). 
 77. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1, at 827 (“[T]he two distinc-
tions point in different directions.”). 
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and shallow, or narrow and deep.78  Yet the latter possibility—the narrow 
and deep decision—poses a difficulty that is easy to appreciate.  A deep 
decision is supported by abstract arguments from fields like political 
science, economics, philosophy and religion.79  For example, a deep de-
cision might limit the power of the state to restrain certain kinds of 
speech on the theory that the free communication of ideas is the best 
means of preventing speech from causing injury.80  Such a decision 
would seem necessarily to have a wide effect.  The theory of speech on 
which such a decision relies is a general one.  If the theory justifies strik-
ing down one prior restraint, then ipso facto it will justify striking down 
another.81 
Prophylaxis explains how depth is compatible with narrowness.  
Although using a theory of free speech to justify a decision will give a 
decision wider effect, it does not prevent a court from using the facts of 
the case to avoid reaching certain questions.  Consider again the Court’s 
decision in Virginia.  As we saw, the Court avoided the question of 
whether diversification of educational opportunities could constitute an 
“exceedingly persuasive” justification for discrimination by finding that 
VMI had not been created in order to diversify the educational oppor-
tunities for men.82  Nevertheless, as Sunstein has observed, the opinion 
“ventured some ambitious remarks.”83  In particular, Justice Ginsburg 
used the principle that the “opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in 
and contribute to society” ought to be made available to citizens on the 
basis of their individual “talents and capacities” to support her conclu-
sion that gender classifications may not lawfully deny “full citizenship 
stature” to women simply because they are women.84  This conclusion, in 
turn, was used to justify application of an elevated standard of review to 
gender classifications.85  Thus, the Court’s use of the facts to avoid 
reaching certain questions and its more ambitious efforts to justify the 
heightened standard of review applicable in cases of gender discrimina-
tion were independent of each other. 
                                                            
 78. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17–19. 
 79. See id. at 13. 
 80. See Part II.C, infra (discussing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring)). 
 81. See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, at 1755 (“Whenever a 
court offers reasons, there is a risk of future regret . . . because the reasons offered in case A may 
turn out, on reflection, to generate a standard, a principle, or a rule that collides with the court’s 
considered judgment about case B.”). 
 82. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539 (1996). 
 83. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 19. 
 84. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. 
 85. Id. at 532–33. 
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We have now seen, in depth, how the Supreme Court can issue nar-
row opinions.  Next I turn to the primary focus of this article, shallow-
ness. 
C.  Shallowness 
In its most basic sense, shallowness is a limit on the theoretical 
depth of a decision.86  A shallow decision is “unaccompanied by abstract 
accounts” of the basis for the decision.87  Of course, shallow decisions 
are supported by reasons;88 what they avoid is taking on “foundational 
issues” or offering a “general theory” or “large account” of the matter at 
hand.89 
1.  An Illustration: Brandenburg v. Ohio 
To better understand shallowness, consider the case of Branden-
burg v. Ohio.90  In Brandenburg, the Court faced the question of what 
limits the First Amendment places on the power of the state to punish 
“subversive advocacy,” or speech critical of the state and advocating rad-
ical change.91  Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader who was video-
taped by a journalist delivering a speech, in full Klan regalia, to Klan 
members at an Ohio rally.  At one point in his speech, Brandenburg said: 
“We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, 
our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s 
possible that there might have to be some revengence taken.”92  He then 
suggested that 400,000 Klansmen would “march[] on Congress,” split 
into two groups, and continue on to Mississippi and to Florida.93 
Ohio prosecuted Brandenburg under its Criminal Syndicalism sta-
tute, which prohibited “advocat[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of 
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means 
of accomplishing industrial or political reform,” as well as “voluntarily 
assembling with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to 
                                                            
 86. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11–14. 
 87. Id. at 13; Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, at 1742 (“I am espe-
cially concerned with the use of ambitious thinking to produce ‘depth’—full accounts of the founda-
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 88. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13; Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 2, 
at 1737, 1755. 
 89. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 1, at 826, 829; see also SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 2, at 13–14. 
 90. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17 (identifying 
Brandenburg as a shallow decision). 
 91. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 119–
24 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
 92. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446. 
 93. Id. 
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teach or advocate” such doctrines.94  The statute, which had been passed 
in 1919, was originally aimed at the Industrial Workers of the World, or 
“I.W.W.,” a militant union of the early twentieth century that advocated 
the use of violence to appropriate industrial control and end the wage 
system.95  After a jury trial, Brandenburg was convicted and sentenced to 
one to ten years in prison.96  The intermediate state appellate court af-
firmed the conviction without an opinion, and the state supreme court 
dismissed the appeal sua sponte, stating simply that “no substantial con-
stitutional question exists herein.”97 
The attention afforded the case by the Ohio appellate courts may 
have made reversal by the United States Supreme Court predictable.98  
However, as one leading commentator has pointed out, the Court’s 
treatment of the case was in some ways surprising.  The facts of the case 
did not “offer[] an occasion for rethinking basic doctrine”; while Klan 
rallies had certainly produced violence in the past, neither the context nor 
the content of Brandenburg’s speech suggested that violence was going 
to occur.99  Moreover, Ohio’s power to punish “criminal syndicalism” 
was well established; as the Court itself noted, a similar statute had been 
upheld over forty years earlier in Whitney v. California.100  There, the 
Court had affirmed the conviction of Anita Whitney, a well known social 
activist, who was prosecuted under California’s criminal syndicalism act 
after she attended a convention of the Communist Labor Party where a 
resolution was adopted expressing approval of the I.W.W.101  The prose-
cution’s theory was that the Communist Labor Party of California had 
adopted the militant stance of the I.W.W.102  In upholding the conviction, 
Justice Sanford gave “great weight” to the state legislature’s judgment, 
                                                            
 94. Id. at 444–45. 
 95. See KALVEN, supra note 91, at 121; Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of 
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 100. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 101. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 364–66 (1927); see also KATHLEEN M. 
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evidenced in the criminal syndicalism act, that such associations posed a 
serious threat to the security of the state.103 
Given the facts in the case and the Whitney precedent, the most 
likely outcome of Brandenburg seemed to be a reversal of the convic-
tion.  Yet, the Supreme Court struck down the Ohio statute and an-
nounced a new rule that afforded subversive advocacy broader protec-
tions under the First Amendment.104  Under the rule announced by the 
Court, a state may not punish subversive advocacy consistent with the 
First Amendment unless “such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”105 
The manner in which the Court struck down the Ohio statute and 
announced its new rule was also surprising.  The opinion was per cu-
riam—a device usually reserved to signal a decision of little signific-
ance—and the Court’s description of the new rule lasted only a few pag-
es.106  Justification for the new standard was essentially confined to a 
single paragraph.  The Court stated: 
[In Whitney we] upheld the [criminal syndicalism] statute on the 
ground that, without more, “advocating” violent means to effect po-
litical and economic change involves such danger to the security of 
the State that the State may outlaw it.  Cf. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 
380 (1927).  But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later 
decisions.  See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951).  
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.  [Here the Court’s footnote cites Dennis and Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-324 (1957).]  As we said in Noto v. Unit-
ed States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1961), “the mere abstract teach-
ing . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to 
force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent 
action and steeling it to that action.”107 
                                                            
 103. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371. 
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It is this defense of the Court’s new rule that makes Brandenburg a 
“shallow” decision in Sunstein’s sense.  There are several points worth 
making about the passage above.  First, it satisfies Sunstein’s basic de-
scription of shallowness.  The Court makes no attempt to justify the new 
rule by reference to a “general theory” of free speech.  It offers no ac-
count of the “foundations” of the First Amendment or of how a rule li-
miting the power of the state to punish subversive advocacy to cases of 
“imminent lawless action” derives from those foundations. 
To be sure, the Court did cite earlier decisions that it characterized 
as having “thoroughly discredited” the position it wanted to discard.  
Yet, as several commentators have observed, the decisions cited by the 
Court do not hold that the state may not punish a speaker that advocates 
using violence to accomplish change.108  Dennis v. United States, in 
which the Court upheld the conviction of several Communist leaders un-
der the Smith Act, is memorable mostly for the Court’s application of 
Judge Learned Hand’s tort-inspired interpretation of the clear-and-
present-danger test.109  Judge Hand’s test required the Court to consider, 
among other factors, the gravity of the harm the state sought to pre-
vent.110  Because the gravity of the harm was so great in Dennis—
eventual revolution by the proletariat—the Court was able to affirm the 
convictions even though there was no evidence of an imminent threat to 
the security of the state.111  Subsequently, in Yates v. United States, Jus-
tice Harlan drew the line at “urg[ing someone] to do something, now or 
in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.”112  But this 
standard, like the standard in Dennis, plainly permits the state to punish 
advocacy of violence even when it is not imminent but merely lies “in 
the future.”113  Because these decisions affirm the power of the state to 
prohibit a speaker from advocating future violence to effect change, they 
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provide no justification—and certainly not a highly theoretical one—for 
the Court’s holding in Brandenburg. 
Brandenburg’s shallowness is especially apparent when compared 
with Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney.114  Like the Branden-
burg Court, Justice Brandeis believed that the First Amendment requires 
a harm to be imminent before speech may be abridged.115  However, un-
like the Brandenburg Court, Justice Brandeis marshaled a number of 
ambitious arguments in support of his position: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the 
state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its 
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  They believed 
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth . . . that it is hazardous to discourage 
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that re-
pression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the 
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for 
evil counsels is good ones.116 
This passage contains at least four theoretical justifications for broad 
First-Amendment protections of subversive advocacy.117  The last clause 
in particular addresses Justice Sanford’s concern about the “spark” of 
speech that could “explode,” suggesting that the best way to prevent the 
spark from exploding was to allow further speech to smother it.  Gov-
ernment censorship would have precisely the opposite effect.118 
2.  Shallowness and Context in Brandenburg 
The shallowness of Brandenburg leaves us with something of a 
puzzle.  Why would the Supreme Court reverse a forty-year-old 
precedent in a per curiam opinion but devote only a paragraph to justify-
ing its new approach?  Neither the facts of the case nor the precedents 
cited by the Court readily explain its conduct.  Why reverse Whitney in 
this way? 
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Although a number of factors undoubtedly explain the Court’s con-
duct in Brandenburg, one is the effect of political context on the deci-
sion.  Here, “political context” does not mean “politics” or the idea that 
politics influence the Supreme Court’s decisions in an inappropriate way.  
“Political context” refers instead to the important questions of public pol-
icy that are pressing at any one moment in our democracy.  In this sense, 
it seems likely that political context often affects how the Supreme Court 
resolves the dispute before it.  In particular, the question of the limits of 
state power to punish subversive advocacy has been posed to the Court in 
a number of different political contexts and with different effect.119  Po-
litical context has affected how the Court understood “subversive advo-
cacy,” what the competing interests were, and how those interests should 
be balanced.120  Less obviously, perhaps, political context has also af-
fected how the Court has gone about justifying its decisions to the rest of 
government and to the public at large.  Although not Sunstein’s, this idea 
both helps to explain shallowness and will figure centrally in the argu-
ment developed below. 
The effect of political context on legal justification is apparent 
when the political context of Whitney is compared to that of Branden-
burg.  Anita Whitney was arrested and charged with criminal syndical-
ism in November 1919, in the midst of the first great “Red Scare” to grip 
the United States.121  The recent victory of the Bolsheviks in the Russian 
Revolution had precipitated the formation of an American Communist 
party.122  Several different factions emerged; the “Communist Labor Par-
ty of America,” of which Whitney was a member, called for a “unified 
revolutionary working class movement in America” and endorsed the 
“revolutionary industrial unionism” of the I.W.W., which was engaged, it 
said, in a “long and valiant struggle . . . in the class war.”123  The CLP 
was the less radical of the two dominant Communist factions.124  At the 
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same time that the party began to take root, “thousands” of labor strikes 
took place across the country, and beginning in May 1919, self-described 
“anarchists” undertook a series of bombings as part of an effort to strike 
at “the capitalist class.”125  The September 1920 bomb attack on Wall 
Street killed thirty and stood as the worst terrorist attack on American 
soil until the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.126  Days after the bomb-
ing, President Woodrow Wilson suffered a “catastrophic stroke.”127  
Waves of panic, reactive violence, and nativism swept the country 
throughout the period.128 
The rhetoric of the revolutionaries of the time—the Socialists, the 
Communists, the anarchists, and the militant branches of organized la-
bor—was often abstract and utopian.129  Yet, these revolutionaries were 
no less committed or violent for their turgid prose.  With actual revolu-
tions occurring abroad and instability being felt at home, the Supreme 
Court in Whitney may have viewed even the abstract advocacy of future 
violence as evidencing a potentially serious threat to state security and 
public safety.130  This may explain, in part, the Court’s willingness at the 
time to permit the punishment of speakers advocating violent revolution 
sometime in the distant future.  Two years before Whitney, Justice San-
ford described the Court’s reasoning this way: “A single revolutionary 
spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a 
sweeping and destructive conflagration.”131  With this understanding of 
the political context, the Supreme Court was unwilling to interpose an 
imminence requirement between the state and the speaker.  If the state 
legislature deemed it appropriate to ban abstract subversive advocacy, 
then the First Amendment did not require the Court to intervene.132 
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By the time of Brandenburg, the political context in which the 
Court was working had shifted considerably.  The Smith Act of 1940, 
which made advocating the violent overthrow of any government in the 
United States unlawful, had been used to crush the Communist party at 
home.133  The second “Red Scare” had passed, and Communism was 
now principally an external threat.134  Internally, a different set of 
changes were taking place.  These changes were primarily social in na-
ture, including the movement to guarantee the civil rights of all citi-
zens.135  The civil rights movement and the associated anti-Vietnam war 
movement were by no means without violence.136  Nevertheless, these 
movements differed in an important respect from the events of the 19-
teens and 1920s: they did not really present a genuine threat to the secu-
rity of the state.  Moreover, while violence did occur, “[n]onviolence was 
the watchword of the civil rights movement, as it was for most anti-
Vietnam activists.”137  Most reformers sought to instigate political 
change within the system.138 
The altered political context explains, in part, why the Supreme 
Court could write such a shallow decision in Brandenburg.  It did not 
need to rebut the Whitney majority as Justice Brandeis had attempted to 
do in his concurrence.  The idea that abstract advocacy of violence could 
pose a threat to the security of the state and public safety was simply 
much less convincing in 1969 than it was in the 1920s. 
Stepping back, we can see that the context of a shallow decision 
may play an important role in justifying its outcome.139  Shallow deci-
sions are “unaccompanied by abstract accounts” justifying their out-
comes.140  Abstraction is always abstraction away from the facts of a par-
ticular context.  Thus, shallow decisions, which lack abstractions, impli-
                                                                                                                                     
That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, 
present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range 
of legislative discretion, is clear.  Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to 
the public peace and the security of the State.  They threaten breaches of the peace and 
ultimate revolution.  And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, be-
cause the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.  The State cannot rea-
sonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance 
of a jeweler’s scale. 
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cate the facts of the particular context in which they occur.  These facts 
may have a persuasive effect, as they likely had in Brandenburg.  The 
facts may suggest, without the need for an ambitious theoretical argu-
ment, that a particular outcome is appropriate or inappropriate.  In short, 
where a deep decision is justified ultimately by an abstraction, a shallow 
decision is justified in large part by the context in which it occurs.141 
III.  CONNECTING MINIMALISM AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
With a firmer grip on narrowness and shallowness, we are now in a 
position to consider why Sunstein believes that decisions that manifest 
these characteristics promote democracy. 
A.  An Account of Deliberative Democracy 
Sunstein thinks that “the American constitutional system” aspires to 
be a deliberative democracy and that minimalism promotes deliberative 
democracy.142  “Deliberative democracy” is an account of democracy 
that puts political deliberation—“reason-giving in the public domain”—
at the center of collective policy-making and the exercise of state pow-
er.143  To understand how minimalism might promote deliberative de-
mocracy in particular, we need to take a closer look at deliberative de-
mocracy and the role it allots to minimalist courts. 
1.  Accountability and the Justification of State Power 
In a “democratic constitutional system,” policies are set by repre-
sentatives who are made accountable to the public through a framework 
of political institutions and personal rights.144  For example, the popular 
vote gives the public electoral control over its representatives.145  A legis-
lator who displeases her constituency is likely to soon be replaced; in 
some cases, the public may even possess the power of recall.  Rights of 
speech and assembly enable the public to engage in open deliberation 
over the wisdom of collective policies and to present its views to the 
government.  Other rights, such as the equal weighting of votes, the 
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equal opportunity to influence one’s elected representatives, and the 
equal access to elected office also function in part to ensure accountabili-
ty.146  The aim of this framework of rights and institutions is to “con-
nect[] [political decision-making] to the interests and judgments of those 
whose conduct is to be regulated by the decisions”—namely, the pub-
lic.147 
Accountability in turn plays an important role in justifying the ex-
ercise of state power.  To accomplish its ends, the government must be 
able to bind individuals with collective policies.148  For example, to en-
sure public safety, the government will need to prohibit attacks on others.  
To ensure health, the government will need to regulate the disposal of 
hazardous wastes.  When individuals fail to comply with such policies, 
the government may need to employ coercion.  The legitimacy of such 
measures in a democracy is based in part on the accountability of the 
government to the public.  The framework of rights and institutions de-
scribed above, which makes the government answerable to the people, 
also allows the public to collectively authorize the exercise of state pow-
er.149  This authorization is what makes the exercise of state power in a 
democracy legitimate. 
A deliberative conception of democracy begins to emerge when we 
take a closer look at this simple account of legitimacy.  Several deficien-
cies with the above account are immediately apparent.  To begin with, 
while it is “the public”—the citizens as a whole—that authorizes the 
state to exercise power, it is individuals, for the most part, on whom state 
power is applied.  Unlike “the public,” individual citizens have very little 
control over election outcomes.  Despite possessing rights to vote, to 
speak and publish, and to assemble, an individual will often find that 
someone other than his preferred candidate has been elected.  Even if a 
preferred candidate does prevail, once in office she will inevitably sup-
port some policies with which the constituent disagrees, even strongly.  
This is the normal course of events in a democracy of heterogeneous in-
dividuals.  But if individuals do not “authorize” the exercise of state 
power, with what legitimacy does the state enforce its laws against them?  
Why should citizens regard themselves as being “bound to honor the 
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structure of their constitutional democratic regime and abide by the sta-
tutes and laws enacted under it”?150 
The deliberative view of democracy is based on an account of the 
justification of state power that answers these questions.151  According to 
the deliberative account, state power is justified when it arises out of an 
ideal procedure of political justification, namely, deliberation among free 
and equal citizens.152  In this context, to say that citizens are “free” is to 
say that their status as citizens does not depend on whether they ascribe 
to a particular set of fundamental beliefs and values.153  Free citizens are 
free to revise their fundamental beliefs and values—to leave one reli-
gious denomination for another, for example—without giving up the 
rights and privileges of citizenship.  In making such decisions, they re-
gard themselves as having the power to judge the merits of competing 
value systems.  Similarly, in making claims on the resources of govern-
ment and society, they regard their concerns and reasons as having 
weight independent of any relation to a value system.154  To say that citi-
zens are “equal” is to say that each is recognized as possessing the capac-
ities necessary to engage in political life, in particular, to engage in deli-
beration with others over the wisdom of collective policies.155 
Deliberation among free and equal citizens imposes special de-
mands on its participants.  In general, deliberation is the process of 
weighing reasons to act or to believe and tying one’s decision to the out-
come of that weighing.156  In a democracy, deliberation is among equals 
in the sense described above.  Each citizen is regarded as possessing the 
necessary capacities to participate in deliberation, and thus, each person 
has equal standing in the process.157  This means that decision-making 
cannot proceed by ignoring the concerns of some of its participants or by 
treating those concerns as having less weight or no weight at all.  Moreo-
ver, because those deliberating are free, the considerations that are com-
pelling are simply those that the participants would regard as being so; 
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no system of fundamental values and beliefs provides the measure of 
persuasiveness.158 
In this setting, justification for the exercise of state power takes the 
form of adducing considerations in support of a collective policy that 
others have reason to accept.159  This gives individuals who disagree with 
a collective policy a reason to nonetheless accept it as legitimate. 
2.  The Substantive Constraints of Political Justification 
While deliberation is most fundamentally a justificatory procedure, 
deliberative democracy also incorporates several key limits on the sub-
stance of political justification.160  First, participants must assume the 
validity of the democratic constitutional system, along with its associated 
political rights and institutions.161  Views inconsistent with this system 
are afforded no weight.  For example, one could not justify a policy of 
guardianship over a class of adults by arguing that not all citizens should 
be treated as political equals because political equality is an intrinsic fea-
ture of citizenship in democracy.  Nor does the ideal of political justifica-
tion in deliberative democracy require persuasion of one who holds such 
views; only those holding “reasonable” doctrines must be reached.162 
The most significant substantive limit on justification under the de-
liberative view arises from what John Rawls has referred to as “the fact 
of reasonable pluralism.”163  Reasonable pluralism is the diversity of 
fundamental values and beliefs held by citizens.164  The existence of such 
diversity is a permanent and natural feature of democracies,165 in which 
citizens are “free” in the above-discussed sense, and the social diversity 
of the population is augmented by strong traditions of free speech, reli-
gious liberty, and the right of association.  There are deeper reasons to 
expect reasonable pluralism as well.  As history shows, collective reason-
ing about what we ought to do simply does not produce convergence in 
our most basic beliefs and values.166  Nor is there any theory of practical 
reason that says it should.167 
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The fact of reasonable pluralism narrows the class of considerations 
that can justify a proposed policy under the deliberative procedure de-
scribed above.  Remember, deliberation is among free citizens.  This 
means that to justify a policy, one must adduce considerations that other 
citizens regard as persuasive.  If we now assume that citizens vary wide-
ly in their fundamental beliefs and values, and that these commitments 
affect what considerations they find persuasive, it follows that few con-
siderations will be regarded as persuasive by all.  Even among those who 
recognize the relevance of a particular consideration, different individu-
als will afford the consideration different weight in their reasoning.  The 
body of reason that emerges—those considerations that are regarded by 
reasonable individuals as giving them reason to support a collective poli-
cy—is known as “public reason.”168 
Public reason is perhaps most significant for the considerations it 
excludes from the justificatory procedure at the heart of deliberative de-
mocracy.  Proponents argue that the substantive limits encoded in public 
reason work to justify, on democratic grounds, important negative liber-
ties, such as religious liberty and freedom of expression.169  In alternative 
accounts of democracy, such liberties are often conceived of as external 
limits on the democratic process, thus calling into question their source 
of legitimacy.170 
Just as significantly, public reason suggests an answer to the prob-
lem of legitimacy we posed above.  To recall, the problem was to explain 
why the exercise of state power is legitimate when done in execution of 
democratically enacted law.  The framework of rights and institutions 
that makes the government accountable to the public explains this legiti-
macy in part—an accountable government is one authorized to act by 
those to whom it is accountable—but does not provide a fully satisfacto-
ry account of why dissenting individuals ought to feel obliged to obey 
the law. 
Public reason explains the source of obligation to comply with de-
mocratically enacted law.171  A law justified by public reason is ipso fac-
to one each reasonable citizen has reason to accept.  While consensus on 
any policy of significance is unlikely, justification by public reason 
means that even those who reject a policy as being the most reasonable 
have some reason to accept it.172  Dissenting individuals may accept such 
a policy for a number of reasons, including the value of following the 
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deliberative procedure.173  Whatever the calculus of reason, however, the 
result is that under the deliberative account of democracy, even dissent-
ing individuals can endorse a policy according to the terms of their own 
reason.174  Because each citizen can endorse the policy as reasonable, the 
state’s enforcement of the policy by application of coercive force is legi-
timate, and all are obliged to obey the law’s terms.175 
B.  Minimalism and Democratic Deliberation 
Sunstein believes that our democratic constitutional system aspires 
to the deliberative process described above.176  According to Sunstein, 
judicial decision-making interacts with this system in three different 
ways.  First, a legal decision might validate the outcome of the democrat-
ic process, which Sunstein refers to as a “democracy-permitting out-
come.”177  Second, a legal decision might insulate conduct from control 
by democratically enacted rules.  This is a “democracy-foreclosing out-
come.”178  Finally, “democracy-promoting outcomes” are decisions in 
which the court requires a political result to meet the strictures of the de-
liberative model of democracy.179 
That judicial minimalism can produce democracy-permitting out-
comes is perhaps obvious.  A narrow decision can validate the outcome 
of a democratic process by declining to reach a substantive legal chal-
lenge to that outcome.  As Sunstein notes, this is a good way to under-
stand how courts conduct themselves when they are inserted into politi-
cally charged contexts.180  Courts “in the midst of a ‘political thicket’” 
can avoid suffering the costs of wrongly deciding the politicized question 
(or the cost to institutional reputation of deciding it at all) by ruling nar-
rowly, using the facts to avoid reaching the substance of the political 
controversy.181  In a similar sense, minimalist techniques could be used 
to prevent “foreclosing” on democratic activity.182 
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The heart of Sunstein’s position, however, is that judicial minimal-
ism can actively promote deliberative democracy as well.183  It is perhaps 
less obvious why this should be so.  Democracy-promotion involves 
triggering democratic deliberation on a matter of controversy.184  In con-
trast, judicial minimalism is about ways that courts can do less.  In par-
ticular, it requires that courts say less, especially on matters of funda-
mental importance for society.  How could saying less promote delibera-
tive political activity? 
Sunstein’s answer is that even while saying less, courts can use cer-
tain procedures or doctrines to “spur” democratic deliberation.185  Suns-
tein lists six such doctrines: 
(1) Void-for-vagueness doctrine 
(2) Nondelegation doctrine 
(3) Clear statement rule 
(4) Desuetude 
(5) Requiring justification of discrimination by actual purposes 
(6) Requiring court decisions to employ public reason.186 
To see how a court might spur deliberative democracy by using the 
doctrines on this list, consider the first example, vagueness.187 
1.  Papachristou and the Vagueness Doctrine 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court heard a 
challenge to a Florida anti-vagrancy law.188  Petitioners in the case were 
eight individuals charged and convicted under the law, which deemed as 
vagrants those who were, among others, “[r]ogues and vagabonds, . . . 
dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons 
who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, com-
mon night walkers, [or] persons wandering or strolling around from 
place to place without any lawful purpose or object . . . .”189  The Court 
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invalidated the law because it was unconstitutionally vague, declaring 
that it failed to “give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice” of the 
criminality of his conduct, and that it encouraged the police to make “ar-
bitrary and erratic” arrests and prosecutions.190  This two-pronged test—
fair notice and arbitrary enforcement—still forms the basis of the con-
temporary vagueness doctrine.191 
The decision in Papachristou was narrow.  Despite recognizing that 
loitering was “historically part of the amenities of life as we have known 
them,” the Court did not strike down the anti-vagrancy law on substan-
tive due process grounds.192  Such a holding would have dramatically 
limited the power of municipal authorities to regulate similar conduct, in 
particular, as part of an effort to combat the criminality with which loi-
tering is sometimes associated.193  Instead, the Court held that because 
the activities were “historically part of the amenities of life as we have 
understood them,” those convicted for engaging in the activities would 
have had no notice that their conduct was criminal.194  The constitutional 
error in the law was thus procedural, not substantive. 
By ruling on procedural grounds, the Court triggered the democrat-
ic process.  With Jacksonville’s ordinance declared unconstitutional, the 
municipality had to rewrite the law.  A broader, substantive due process 
holding would have effectively eliminated the possibility of such an or-
dinance.  The narrower, procedural due process holding instead simply 
required the city to rewrite the ordinance with a greater degree of preci-
sion.  The political process in Jacksonville was thereby forced to deter-
mine how to refashion its ordinance so as to pass constitutional muster 
while still accomplishing the goals of catching inchoate criminal con-
duct.  Since precision was required, the local legislature would be re-
quired to settle on the ordinance’s terms; it could not simply pass off to 
the police a blank check to arrest whoever seemed suspicious.  By void-
ing for vagueness, the Court spurred political processes to reform the 
invalidated law. 
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2.  Chicago v. Morales: A Constitutional Right to Loiter? 
It is revealing to compare Papachristou with the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Chicago v. Morales, where the Court struck down 
another anti-loitering ordinance.195  Morales concerned the constitutio-
nality of Chicago’s “Gang Congregation Ordinance,” which permitted 
municipal police to arrest “any group of two or more people who re-
mained in a public place ‘with no apparent purpose’ if the police ‘rea-
sonably believe[d]’ the group included a gang member and if the loiter-
ers failed to disperse” upon police order.196  As it had in Papachristou, 
the Court in Morales invalidated the law on vagueness grounds, conclud-
ing that it failed to provide adequate guidelines to law enforcement.197 
However, in a section of the opinion joined by only a plurality of 
the justices, Justice Stevens adopted the position of the Illinois Supreme 
Court that “the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘li-
berty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”198  While the position did not garner a majority, Justice Stevens 
seemed to regard due process and vagueness as being jointly sufficient to 
facially invalidate the ordinance.199  Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia 
characterized the majority’s position in a similar way.200  Moreover, as 
one commentator noted, by singling out loitering and stating that its law-
fulness could not turn on the unguided exercise of police discretion, the 
Court impliedly recognized a liberty interest to engage in such con-
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duct.201  The result has been confusion about the vagueness doctrine and 
whether the defect in Morales was procedural or substantive in nature.202 
This confusion is evident in decisions following Morales.  For ex-
ample, while courts have struck down anti-loitering ordinances under 
Morales, they have tended to uphold public-order ordinances directed at 
similar activities, such as “obstruction,”203 in effect limiting Morales to 
loitering.204  Driven by alternative views of the constitutional issue, legis-
lative bodies seeking to enact similar provisions have also taken a variety 
of approaches.205  Chicago gave up criminalizing “innocent” loitering by 
non-gang members altogether; it defined a new crime, “gang loitering,” 
by incorporating verbatim language from Justice O’Connor’s Morales 
concurrence.206  Nevertheless, the city still declined to impose a mens rea 
requirement—the absence of which had drawn the plurality’s atten-
tion207—and applied the new ordinance to only certain designated “hot 
spots” within the city, raising questions about its constitutionality under 
the Equal Protection Clause.208 
Although the comparison is imperfect, the aftermath of Morales il-
lustrates the importance of narrow decisions for democracy.  The holding 
in Morales comes close enough to protecting loitering that it problema-
tizes efforts to regulate similar conduct even where guidelines for en-
forcement are provided.  In contrast, no such difficulty was created by 
the decision in Papachristou, which left open the power of the legislature 
to regulate the conduct in question.  By striking down the regulation on 
strictly procedural grounds, the Court spurred the legislature to reex-
amine the matter and to pass a new law. 
IV.  WHY MINIMALISM DOES NOT PROMOTE DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 
There are two significant problems with the minimalist view of Pa-
pachristou offered above.  First, while Papachristou was a narrow deci-
sion, it was also relatively deep.  Justice Douglas rested the Court’s deci-
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sion on an examination of the history of anti-vagrancy laws as well as 
our own traditions of “wandering.”209  He based the fair notice analysis 
on the premise that “[l]iving under a rule of law entails various supposi-
tions,” such as fair notice.210  This depth complicates the account offered 
above.  Second, the notion of deliberation seems to be doing no work in 
the account above of how minimalism triggers democracy.  Why should 
we believe that Papachristou triggered deliberation in particular?  Cer-
tainly the minimalist character of the decision provides no reason to 
think that this is the case. 
It was the maximalist character of Papachristou—its depth—that 
suggests it triggered democratic deliberation.  To show why this is true, I 
am going to develop a simple model of deliberation based on the exam-
ples we have already discussed.  This model will highlight the difficulties 
that shallow decisions face in spurring deliberation. 
A.  The Argument 
Deliberation is an exchange of reasons.  However, not all ex-
changes of reason count as deliberation.  Generally, speakers must offer 
reasons that “conflict” to count as deliberating with each other.  Consider 
the following case, in which the reasons offered do not conflict: 
STUDENT:  Smith ought to take a bus, because it doesn’t cost 
much. 
BUSINESSPERSON:  Smith ought to take a train, because it is a 
safe way to travel. 
Assume that the conduct recommended by the student is inconsis-
tent with the conduct recommended by the businessperson.  If Smith 
takes a bus, then he cannot also take a train.  Even so, the reason the stu-
dent gives for taking a bus does not on its face conflict with the reason 
given by the businessperson.  The businessperson, being in business, un-
derstands the value of doing things at low cost.  Surely the businessper-
son could believe both that one ought to travel cheaply and that one 
ought to travel safely.  Presumably the student and Smith could also have 
both beliefs.  In this sense, the student’s and the businessperson’s reasons 
do not conflict.  In a conversation where each uttered the sentence above, 
they would not really be deliberating about what Smith ought to do; they 
would be “talking past each other,” in the usual sense of the expression. 
There are other ways in which reasons can fail to conflict.  Consid-
er this example: 
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BELIEVER:  Smith ought not to compete on Sunday, since by 
doing so he would be breaking the Sabbath. 
SECULARIST:  Smith ought to compete on Sunday, since Sunday 
has no special significance, and if Smith does not participate, he 
cannot win the competition. 
Here again Smith must choose between two inconsistent courses of 
conduct, and here again the reasons offered by the believer and the secu-
larist do not conflict.  But in this case, the absence of conflict cannot be 
explained in the same way.  Smith cannot simultaneously acknowledge 
both the believer’s and the secularist’s considerations as reasons for him 
to act. 
Sunday has significance for the believer because of his values and 
beliefs.  Just to put a word to this, we might say that Sunday is religious-
ly significant—i.e., Sunday is the Sabbath—from the “point of view” of 
the believer.211  This is just meant to reflect the intuitive sense in which 
our beliefs, values, and interests are like a location from which we view 
the world and the demands it places on us.212  Sabbath-breaking becomes 
a matter of practical significance when one takes a religious point of 
view.  In contrast, from the secularist point of view, working on Sunday 
has no such practical significance.  For our purposes, the important point 
is that Smith cannot take both points of view simultaneously; to be a se-
cularist is eo ipso not to be a believer, and vice versa.  Because Smith 
cannot take both points of view simultaneously, Smith cannot acknowl-
edge both considerations as compelling. 
Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the reasons of-
fered by the believer and by the secularist do not conflict.  The believer 
and the secularist have different points of view.  It is only because each 
has the point of view he has that Sunday means what it does to him.  But 
that Sunday has special significance for a believer is perfectly consistent 
with the proposition that Sunday lacks special significance for a secular-
ist.  In this sense, the reasons offered do not conflict, and the believer and 
the secularist are not deliberating. 
I want to consider one more example.  I am going to change things 
slightly by introducing a third conversational partner.  Nevertheless, the 
example will be quite familiar: 
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SANFORD:  Anita Whitney’s conviction should be upheld because 
her speech was a “spark” that in this fragile political climate could 
explode into full-scale terrorism or revolution.213 
PER CURIAM:  Anita Whitney’s conviction should be struck be-
cause she associated with those who only abstractly advocated ter-
rorism or revolution.214 
BRANDEIS:  Anita Whitney’s conviction should be struck because 
the best medicine for speech is more speech.  This is especially the 
case in a fragile political climate, because in such a situation, gov-
ernment censorship is more likely than speech to ignite violence.215 
 
Sanford is at odds with both “Per Curiam” and Brandeis over what 
to do with Anita Whitney’s conviction.  On its face, the reason offered 
by Per Curiam to strike Whitney’s conviction does not conflict with the 
reason offered by Sanford to uphold it.  In contrast, Brandeis’s reason to 
strike Whitney’s conviction does conflict with Sanford’s reason because 
it expressly mentions Sanford’s statement and explains why it is mista-
ken.  To Brandeis, a fragile political climate does not call for censorship 
because censorship is even more likely than abstract speech to ignite a 
violent response.  By taking up Sanford’s reasons for upholding Whit-
ney’s conviction and suggesting why they are mistaken, Brandeis invites 
Sanford to respond in defense of his view.  In short, Brandeis’s statement 
will spur deliberation. 
Note that Brandeis’s statement is characterized by a level of ab-
straction absent from both Sanford’s and Per Curiam’s statements.  
Brandeis has identified a shared understanding of the First Amendment 
in virtue of which Sanford’s concern about political fragility appears 
misguided.  The shared understanding is that, all other things being 
equal, the First Amendment reflects the founders’ belief that the best 
medicine for bad speech is more speech.  This principle says why the 
First Amendment should protect even bad speech, such as speech that 
abstractly advocates violence.  Applied to Anita Whitney, the principle 
gives someone as concerned as Sanford a reason to believe that Whit-
ney’s conviction ought to be struck.  In other words, in virtue of this First 
Amendment theory, Whitney’s conviction ought to be struck. 
Sunstein’s “shallowness” is the absence of abstraction in precisely 
this sense.  The Brandenburg decision was shallow precisely because it 
refrained from invoking a theory of free speech to justify its rejection of 
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the Whitney majority.216  Its rejection of Whitney was conclusory, and it 
may have reflected changes in the political context and the Court’s un-
derstanding of the threat posed by the abstract advocacy of violence.  
The Court made no attempt to abstract away from the political context 
and provide neutral reasons rooted in political philosophy that would 
have given a Sanford-sympathizer reason to surrender her concerns.  In 
short, no effort was made to deliberate with the Sanford sympathizer.  
Like Sanford and Per Curiam in the above dialogue, the reasons of the 
Whitney majority and those of the Brandenburg Court simply do not con-
flict. 
The point can be expressed in the form of a dilemma.  Consider the 
following four propositions: 
(1) Sunstein’s thesis (ST):  Minimalism promotes deliberative de-
mocracy. 
(2) Minimalism definition (MD):  Minimalism is narrowness and 
shallowness. 
(3) Shallowness definition (SD):  Shallow decisions do not contain 
abstract considerations. 
(4) Deliberation (D):  Deliberation often requires abstraction. 
Loosely speaking, (ST) and (MD) together imply that shallowness 
promotes deliberative democracy.  Yet, (MD) and (SD) together imply 
that minimalist decisions are not abstract, and together with (D), this 
proposition implies that minimalism will often undercut deliberation.  
The proposition that minimalism often undercuts deliberation is obvious-
ly inconsistent with (ST).  Because the four propositions “imply” a con-
tradiction, one of the propositions must be false. 
In a sentence, the problem is that shallowness strips a court’s deci-
sion of what is often required for another party to deliberatively engage 
that decision.  To be sure, this is a problem with the thesis that minimal-
ism promotes deliberative democracy.  It is not a problem with the thesis 
that minimalism permits democracy or may be used to prevent the forec-
losure of democracy.  Unlike these two latter claims, the promotion the-
sis involves the Court in spurring democratic deliberation.  But spurring 
deliberation often requires precisely the sort of abstraction that shallow 
decisions lack. 
Recall the case of Papachristou.  I argued above that Papachristou 
was a deep decision and asserted that it was democracy-promoting pre-
cisely because it was deep.  If the decision was to provide guidance to 
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localities as to how, within constitutional limits, they could control sus-
picious behavior, then a developed theory of those limits had to be dep-
loyed.  Without such a theory, Jacksonville would have had little idea as 
to how to correct its constitutional error.  Any subsequent ordinance 
would have represented the city’s own estimation of what the Constitu-
tion required.  By imagining the Supreme Court and Jacksonville as deli-
berative partners in a democratic constitutional system, we can put the 
point this way: unless the Court delivered a suitably abstract decision, 
Jacksonville would not have been able to respond with an ordinance that 
vindicated the policy behind due process.  The Court would not have 
given reasons to Jacksonville with which it could comply by constructing 
an ordinance that acknowledged the force of those reasons. 
What emerges on this approach is that the Supreme Court promotes 
deliberative democracy by engaging the political branches, the states, 
and the people as a deliberative partner.217  As a deliberative partner, 
what restricts the Court is exactly what enables it to promote deliberative 
democracy: giving reasons.  Requiring the Supreme Court to support its 
decisions with deep reasons promotes democracy in two ways.  First, it 
narrows the options available to the Court in any case it faces.  A Court 
bound by reason and precedent is a court of limited power.  Since the 
justices of the Supreme Court are appointed, limiting the power of the 
justices both permits and prevents the foreclosure of democratic 
processes in the same sense that minimalism does.  Second, reasoning 
deeply in decisions engages the Supreme Court with the other parts of 
our constitutional system.  When the Court gives reasons, it can be deli-
beratively rejected by the people.  The states and Congress can design 
their laws in ways that respond to the reasons the Court has struck down 
or modified previous legislative efforts.  The more the Court engages in 
deep reasoning, the less it appears (and functions) as a kind of constitu-
tional oracle, responsive and responsible to nothing. 
Putting the point differently, spurring deliberation requires partici-
pating in the deliberative process by giving reasons.  Even in defending 
his claim that a minimalist court can spur deliberation, Sunstein does not 
view the Supreme Court as a deliberative partner in the ensuing discus-
sion.218  But where the Supreme Court simply utilizes procedural devices 
to return a matter of dispute to the political branches of government or to 
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the people, there is no reason to think that deliberation—reason-giving, 
in the sense described above—will occur. 
B.  Four Objections 
The argument of this article—that minimalist decisions do not pro-
mote democracy because they lack the abstraction necessary for delibera-
tion—is itself open to several obvious objections.  The argument relies 
on descriptions of minimalism, democracy, and deliberation that Suns-
tein may not share or that may be incoherent.  Answering these objec-
tions helps to clarify the argument in several crucial respects. 
Below I consider four such objections: (1) that the argument above 
takes minimalism to advocate foregoing reason in judicial decisions, 
which it does not; (2) that the model of deliberation presented above fails 
because it assumes that individuals will agree about abstract matters, 
while Sunstein’s point is precisely that individuals often disagree about 
them; (3) that Sunstein does not accept the theories of deliberation and 
deliberative democracy outlined above; and (4) that minimalism is pre-
ferable even if it does not spur deliberation because it communicates re-
spect to those with different views—an important value for unelected 
judicial officers.  As will become clear, while I regard these objections as 
containing important insights, none casts serious doubt on the argument 
presented above. 
1.  Minimalism Does Not Advocate Foregoing Reasons 
How is minimalism inconsistent with the view advocated here?  
Sunstein has always been careful to observe that shallowness and nar-
rowness are matters of degree.219  Minimalists do not argue that courts 
should eschew justifying their decisions with reasons.220  In that respect, 
the role of a judge importantly differs from the role of a jury, because the 
jury need not justify its verdict.221  This position, which Sunstein refers to 
as “full particularity”222 or “reasonlessness”223 is, according to minimal-
ism, a “limiting case” desirable only when disagreement is particularly 
intense and widespread.224  Elsewhere, it is desirable to support the out-
come of a dispute with reasons adequate to justify that outcome.225  What 
level of depth is desirable on any particular occasion will be guided by 
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the amount of disagreement over proffered theoretical justifications, the 
amount of information available to the court, and the judge’s reasonable 
confidence in setting out her theory.226  On occasion, the benefit of ambi-
tious theoretical support will outweigh the costs, and the costs of shallow 
reasoning may from time to time outweigh the benefits.227 
It is true that minimalism does not advocate eschewing the use of 
reasons in judicial decisions.  Nonetheless, minimalism is inconsistent 
with the position defended here.  That position is not simply that rea-
soned decisions are preferable to “reasonless” ones.  Rather, the argu-
ment of this article is that in some cases, justifying a decision by refer-
ence to deeper principles will be necessary to promote democratic delibe-
ration about the issue.  The minimalist straightforwardly denies this the-
sis; as the minimalist conceives it, deep decisions usurp the democratic 
resolution of an issue.  According to the position defended here, that is 
not always true.  Sometimes deep decisions are necessary to promote 
ongoing deliberation among the branches of government and the people. 
2.  Individuals Often Disagree About Foundational Matters 
The discussion above suggests another objection as well.  I argue 
that abstraction is necessary for deliberation.  But how could abstraction 
be necessary for deliberation in cases where there is disagreement about 
the abstractions themselves?  Where abstraction provides no common 
ground, how could its use spur deliberation—at least on the simple mod-
el of deliberation outlined above?  Sunstein does argue that decisions 
should avoid abstract justification where such a justification will gener-
ate disagreement.228  Is Sunstein’s point not simply that judges should 
avoid using abstract accounts to justify the outcomes in their decisions, 
because such accounts are unlikely to be shared?229 
I do not deny that we often disagree about foundational matters, 
such as the reason it is important to protect subversive advocacy in de-
mocracy, or the basis for prohibiting government from “establishing” a 
religion.  My point is simply that avoiding abstraction does not promote 
democracy because abstraction is a common means we employ to delibe-
rate with each other.  Using abstraction, I can meet your objection to my 
view and give you reason to abandon it.  Abstraction may not always 
work, but unless there is another model of deliberation in the offing, one 
cannot promote deliberation by avoiding abstractions.  Abstraction is the 
heart of deliberation because, as Sunstein says, reasons are abstrac-
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tions.230  When faced with a disagreement, if a court engages in what 
Sunstein refers to as “conceptual descent”—focusing on a more concrete 
question—it will not spur deliberation.  Where “conceptual ascent” re-
sults in further disagreement, the best course may be to “ascend” to a 
higher level of abstraction where an agreement is still possible. 
Sunstein often speaks as if disagreement were the principal problem 
with providing an ambitious theoretical support for a decision.231  He 
suggests that we can often agree about particular outcomes without 
agreeing about the theories that justify those outcomes.232  In these cases, 
an “incompletely theorized” decision will result in agreement where a 
more ambitiously reasoned decision could not.233  The point of excess 
depth, then, is the highest conceptual point of agreement.234 
However, it is a serious question whether there is ever a highest 
conceptual point of agreement.  Consider that there is no consensus on 
the vast majority of significant legal questions before the Supreme Court.  
Of course, the Court decides many of its cases with unanimous opinions 
and demonstrates a kind of unanimity on these matters.235  But in broader 
society, there is no such unanimity on these issues.  After all, the Su-
preme Court often grants certiorari because there is a split among lower 
courts about how to resolve a matter.236  Even when no such split exists, 
the parties themselves take different views, and their views nearly always 
have some merit to them, or the Court would not grant certiorari.237  
Even decisions that seemed unremarkable to the Court have inspired sig-
nificant disagreement among the public at large.238 
As an empirical matter, it seems unlikely that there is complete 
agreement about how to resolve any set of significant cases, whether at 
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the level of particular outcomes or ambitious abstract accounts.239  More 
probable is that there is more or less pervasive disagreement.  Some 
questions invite only a small number of people to disagree, while others 
divide citizens more evenly.  Similarly, some questions generate stronger 
disagreements than others.  Given that nearly everything before the Su-
preme Court invites reasonable disagreement, the question is how to re-
solve that disagreement in ways that are consistent with, and promote, 
our deliberative democracy. 
The model of deliberation presented above did not assume that 
there would always be agreement about the abstract basis for a decision.  
Rather, there may be persistent disagreement about general theories.  The 
important point is that such disagreement does not constitute a reason to 
avoid ambitious theoretical arguments.  This is for two main reasons. 
First, proponents of deliberative democracy have long acknowl-
edged that consensus is unlikely on most matters of fundamental impor-
tance to society.240  This admission does not undercut the deliberative 
conception of democracy; namely, that the exercise of state power is jus-
tified when it results from an ideal procedure of political deliberation.  
Deliberative democracy requires only that collective policies are justified 
in terms that reasonable citizens can regard as reasonable, even if not 
ultimately persuasive or the most reasonable.241  For similar reasons, it 
does not offend principles of democracy for a judicial decision to cite 
ambitious reasoning that some happen to reject, as long as the justifica-
tion remains within the boundaries of public reason. 
Deliberative democracy is comfortable with majority rule.242  It ful-
ly contemplates the possibility that individuals will be bound by policies 
that they do not regard as being the most reasonable or wise.  Neverthe-
less, those policies will be democratically legitimate if enacted according 
to democratic procedures and justified in terms that even those who dis-
agree can regard as reasonable.  It is here that deliberative democracy 
parts company with minimalism, which urges silence on the judiciary 
where these sorts of disagreement are possible.243  Judicial silence, how-
ever, does not spur deliberation any more than silence does in ordinary 
life. 
Second, even where there is strong, persistent disagreement about 
fundamental matters, offering a deep justification for a particular out-
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come can still spur the democratic process.  This can happen for a num-
ber of reasons.  Seeing an ambitious argument may drive an opponent to 
articulate an alternative justification.  Moreover, those who initially dis-
agree with a justification may come to agree with it after examining the 
basis of their own views.244  Most of us go through an ongoing process of 
revising our beliefs, and revision can be triggered by coming into contact 
with a persuasively rendered exposition of a view one had previously 
regarded as wrong-headed. 
3.  The Theories of Deliberation and Deliberative Democracy Presented 
Above Are Problematic and Are Not Sunstein’s 
On the view that was presented above, deliberative democracy is 
fundamentally about justifying the exercise of state power.  A third ob-
jection is that Sunstein himself need not, and arguably does not, take 
such a view of deliberative democracy.  In a looser sense, a deliberative 
conception of democracy is simply one that gives pride of place to public 
discussion of political issues—discussion in the broadest sense that in-
cludes simply talking and participating in the political process.  The Su-
preme Court promotes public discussion, in this sense, when it avoids 
final, authoritative judgments and issues shallow decisions, leaving fun-
damental matters to be resolved by others. 
Moreover, the view of deliberation presented above is artificially 
narrow; it excludes a significant amount of activity that could fairly be 
called “deliberation.”  Consider the example of the student and the busi-
nessperson above; the student recommends that Smith travel by bus be-
cause of cost, while the businessperson recommends that Smith travel by 
train because of safety.  I concluded that the student and the businessper-
son were not deliberating because the reasons they offered Smith did not 
“conflict.”  But in a perfectly normal sense of the term, of course, they 
are “deliberating.”  For example, if the businessperson overlooked cost 
considerations, the student’s observation might lead him to change his 
mind and recommend taking the bus.  Are we to say that they did not 
“deliberate”? 
While these criticisms are understandable, they miss the mark.  To 
begin with, there are reasons to think that Sunstein’s view of deliberative 
democracy is based on the justification of state power, like the view 
above.245  For example, Sunstein writes, “[l]egislation cannot be sup-
ported on purely religious grounds; legislation rooted only in religious 
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convictions could not count as valid for citizens who reject those 
grounds as justificatory.”246  More generally, in his view, “[f]or the deli-
berative democrat, political outcomes cannot be supported by self-
interest or force.”247  Sunstein’s view of deliberative democracy thus may 
in fact focus on the problem of political justification.  But apart from 
whether Sunstein in fact takes this view of deliberative democracy, the 
justification of state power is an appropriate focus for a deliberative 
theory of democracy.  It would be a significant conclusion that the de-
mocracy-promotion thesis is incompatible with such an account of deli-
berative democracy. 
Moreover, given the focus on justification, the model of delibera-
tion presented here is a natural one, even if it is narrow and idealized.  
We humans may do many things that can fairly be called “deliberation.”  
Public discussion, as explained above, is surely “deliberation” in a very 
broad sense of the term.  However, in that sense, it is not obvious how 
deliberation is relevant to justifying the exercise of state power.  In other 
words, if what makes the exercise of state power properly democratic is 
its justification by deliberative processes, it is not obvious how simply 
discussing current events could constitute deliberation.  Discussing cur-
rent events does not justify or legitimize the exercise of state power.  Ra-
ther, “support[ing] political outcomes,” in Sunstein’s phrase, requires a 
certain kind of public discussion.  It requires a discussion in which par-
ticipants support outcomes with reasons that reasonable members of so-
ciety can accept.  To do this, participants will often need to abstract away 
from their own beliefs and values.  This is precisely the model of delibe-
ration presented above. 
With this in mind, the businessperson and the student in the exam-
ple above may or may not be “deliberating” in the relevant sense.  The 
crucial requirement is that the participants provide each other with rea-
sons that the other can regard as reason to abandon his or her current 
views.  If the student’s mention of cost causes the businessperson to ree-
valuate her commitment to train travel, then it counts as deliberation in 
my sense.  This may not be the only sense of “deliberation,” or even the 
best; however, it is the model of deliberation most appropriate here. 
4.  Deep Opinions Communicate Disrespect for Those Who Disagree and 
Risk Error 
Lastly, it is important to consider Sunstein’s point that ambitious 
theoretical reasoning in judicial decisions communicates disrespect for 
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those who hold different fundamental views.248  We live in a heterogene-
ous society.  There is a spectrum of reasonable views about matters of 
fundamental importance in our society.  The minimalist argues that, in 
this context, judges ought to avoid employing their fundamental com-
mitments because those views will likely not be shared, and “it is not 
very respectful to take on other people’s most fundamental commitments 
if it is not necessary to do so.”249  Moreover, the risk of error is increased 
by invoking fundamental considerations, which are extremely com-
plex.250 
While there is undoubtedly a sense in which it is respectful to avoid 
challenging someone on their fundamental views, it is far from obvious 
that it is also respectful to remain silent about such matters.  Notably, a 
judge’s decision is binding regardless of whether it explains, or exposes, 
the fundamental basis on which the decision was reached.  But remaining 
silent about why a decision was reached is “respectful” only in an odd 
way.  Few would describe it as “respectful” for government to reach a 
decision without explaining to those affected the actual basis for the de-
cision. 
Moreover, even where we disagree intractably, articulating my rea-
sons for making a particular decision will increase our mutual under-
standing.  It tells you how I think, and it likely reveals to me how you 
think differently.  There is nothing about this process that need be disres-
pectful.251  Indeed, if we take the longer view, it is just the opposite.  My 
decision as a judge is not the last time the issue will be confronted.  
Higher courts, later courts, or democratically enacted legislatures or ex-
ecutives will have an opportunity to revisit my decision and to reevaluate 
its wisdom.  If the grounds for my decision remain unstated, the decision 
will be hermetic and improving on it will be considerably more difficult.  
Outside the realm of law this is true as well.  It will be easier to offer ad-
vice to a friend who has made a bad decision if I know why he acted as 
he did to begin with.  In adjusting my own behavior, insight into why I 
am inclined to act as I do is a necessary prerequisite. 
Thus, not only do deep decisions often spur deliberative democra-
cy, they can also be necessary to the subsequent correction of error.  In 
the judicial context, a deep decision striking down a law will help a legis-
lature craft a constitutional replacement.  It may also help a lower court 
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test a related law.  It may help higher courts and subsequent courts as 
well when faced with revisiting the decision initially made.  In short, 
where the outcome has been settled on, articulating one’s reasons can be 
of great help in correcting error.  Otherwise, one’s next move is likely to 
be a stab in the dark. 
V.  CONCLUSION: DEPTH, DEMOCRACY, AND POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
This article argues that shallow decisions do not promote delibera-
tive democracy because deliberation often requires abstraction.  The mi-
nimalist advocates avoiding abstract accounts where they generate disa-
greement.  Since the possibility of disagreement is likely widespread, 
minimalists will often be forced to resist precisely the sort of conduct 
necessary for deliberation.  It follows that minimalism does not promote 
deliberative democracy. 
This argument is relatively focused.  I have not argued that, all 
things being equal, deep decisions are preferable to shallow decisions.  I 
have not argued that deep decisions will always succeed in promoting 
democratic deliberation.  Nor have I advocated a “moral reading” of the 
Constitution, or any similar approach to constitutional decision-
making.252 
Nonetheless, the position taken in this article fits in with a broader 
view of the proper role of the federal courts in our democratic constitu-
tional system.  This is because, on the view taken in this article, courts 
that offer a more ambitious theoretical justification for their decisions do 
at least part of what is necessary to spur, or promote, deliberation about 
how our society ought to resolve the issues it faces.  In some cases, 
courts will frame a debate that is then carried out by the legislature, the 
executive, and the people.  In this sense, the court becomes a kind of de-
liberative partner with the branches of the government, and with the 
people, in the process of resolving the issues that face political society. 
Some supporters of “popular constitutionalism” take a very similar 
view of the courts.253  Larry Kramer has argued that Madison understood 
the courts as one voice among several offering an interpretation of the 
Constitution: 
The judiciary became an additional voice when it came to constitu-
tional questions: another source of leadership for the community, 
and one more potential check in the system of popular constitutio-
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nalism built into our complex government.  If a bill passed Con-
gress and was signed by the President without a protest from the 
states, it was still possible for the Supreme Court to raise a constitu-
tional objection and ask the public to reconsider by wielding its 
power of review as what amounted to a judicial veto.254 
The design of the government, including the courts, was meant to 
improve public deliberation in a system where the ultimate authority to 
resolve an issue lay with the public.255 
In the Introduction, I argued that one of the most attractive 
attributes of Sunstein’s minimalism was that it explained how courts 
could fit into our broader democratic constitutional system.  The idea, in 
brief, was that a minimalist court left the most difficult issues unre-
solved, so that the people and the popular branches of government could 
address them.  This view undercut, in part, the criticism of the judiciary 
as a countermajoritarian force usurping powers properly reserved to the 
other branches of government. 
Advocating theoretical depth in judicial decisions does not necessi-
tate giving up on a satisfying view of the place of courts in our democra-
cy.  If one conceives of the judiciary as a deliberative partner in a system 
where the people have the final authority over the interpretation of the 
Constitution, the presence of ambitious theoretical reasoning in judicial 
decisions loses much of its threatening, anti-democratic character.  In-
deed, by providing depth, the judiciary can contribute to “refin[ing] and 
improv[ing] public deliberations, so as to ensure that the sovereign, con-
trolling public opinion [is] also reasonable and just.”256  In many ways, 
the judiciary is well suited to this task, given its particular institutional 
competences and its relative insulation from popular control. 
Sunstein’s minimalism remains for many reasons an attractive ac-
count of judicial decision-making.  It has been the argument of this ar-
ticle, however, that the connection between minimalism and democracy 
is highly problematic.  Moreover, it is not obvious that theoretical depth 
is anti-democratic, or countermajoritarian.  Indeed, depth may be the ju-
diciary’s contribution to a healthy public deliberation about the most dif-
ficult questions we face. 
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